I am a PhD candidate in Economics at Aalto University and Helsinki GSE. I am also a member of the Helsinki GSE IO Group. My research focuses on industrial organization, with particular interests in collusion, regulation, and pharmaceutical markets.
I will be on the 2026–27 academic job market.
Job Market Paper
Focal Points and Reference Prices in the Finnish Pharmaceutical Market with Matias Pousi
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We study how reference price regulations work in the Finnish pharmaceutical market. Using product-level data, we document systematic price increases equal to the width of the regulated price band and show that many firms align their bids with the previous quarter’s reference price in the quarterly price auction. When all firms in a market submit price bids at this focal point, the reference price shifts upward, benefiting firms at the expense of patients. Six firms exhibit this pricing pattern particularly frequently: Actavis, Sandoz, Hexal, Ratiopharm, Orion, and Teva. We investigate these findings using a combination of descriptive evidence, reduced-form analysis, and structural modeling.Working Papers
Competition or Collusion? Entry Decisions in the Swedish Pharmaceutical Market with Otto Toivanen, CEPR Discussion Paper DP21676
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Price regulation may have unintended consequences, such as facilitating collusion or softening actual price competition by causing a reduction in the number of active firms. Observing different firms having a monopoly position in parts of a market may be the result of either intense post-entry competition and non-cooperative entry decisions, or collusive entry. This phenomenon and large price differences per pill within a market are widespread in the Swedish generic pharmaceutical market where price regulation through monthly auctions for each active ingredient–dosage form–strength–package size combination channels a large part of demand to the winner within each such substitution group. 22% of the markets are potentially collusive in having at least two firms as monopolies for different substitution groups at least some of the time and prices per pill in such markets are on average significantly higher. We take a structural model tailored to the Swedish circumstances to data on two markets. In one market, the entry patterns (monopoly package sizes) are suggestive of actual, in the other of attempted, collusion. Our counterfactual analysis where we induce substitution across package sizes yield savings of >50% in the first market, but lead to a modest expenditure increase in the other because intensified post-entry competition induces exit.A Stylized Logit Demand Model with Internal Reference Pricing
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I study conditions for the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a logit model that incorporates an internal reference price and a copayment structure. Using the Intermediate Value Theorem, I prove equilibrium existence in a two‑product market and show that the equilibrium is unique under additional restrictions: the two firms must be sufficiently different so that their best‑response functions cross but do not overlap over an interval. I then extend the existence result to an n-product market with an aggregative‑game approach.Teaching Assistant
Math Camp, Ph.D. level: Aug 2024, Aug 2025
Empirical Industrial Organization, M.Sc. level: Oct 2024, Oct 2025
Principles of Economics, B.Sc. level: Sep 2022, Sep 2023, Sep 2024, Sep 2025
Intermediate Macroeconomics II, B.Sc. level: Mar 2023, Mar 2024, Mar 2025
Mathematics for Economists, B.Sc. level: Oct 2021
Seminar & Conference Presentations
2026: NORIO (Copenhagen), CEPR Health Economics (Toulouse), CRESSE (Kos), EARIE (Mannheim), Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority (Helsinki), European Commission DG-Comp (Brussels)