I am a PhD candidate in Economics at Aalto University and Helsinki GSE. I am also a member of the Helsinki GSE IO Group. My research focuses on industrial organization, with particular interests in competition, price regulation, and pharmaceutical markets.
I am on the 2026–27 job market.
Job Market Paper
Reference Pricing as a Focal Point: Evidence from the Finnish Pharmaceutical Market with Matias Pousi
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The reference price system adopted in the Finnish pharmaceutical market in 2009 initially decreased prices, but after a few years, firms learned to game the system, and prices gradually returned to their pre-reform level. How did firms succeed in raising the price level, and what role did the regulation play in this process? We find that firms learned to use the previous quarter's reference price as a focal point when choosing prices at the beginning of each quarter; these prices determine the reference price for the whole quarter. Six big generic firms were more likely to follow this focal-point pricing rule, and their presence was associated with similar behavior among smaller rivals. According to our results, 65% of products have a profitable downward deviation from the upward pricing path but only 13% deviate. The remaining 52% suggests potential coordination. On the positive side, we show that after the quarterly reference price is determined, it constrains firms from increasing prices higher.Working Papers
Competition or Collusion? Entry Decisions in the Swedish Pharmaceutical Market with Otto Toivanen, CEPR Discussion Paper DP21676 📄 VoxEU Column
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Price regulation may have unintended consequences, such as facilitating collusion or softening actual price competition by causing a reduction in the number of active firms. Observing different firms having a monopoly position in parts of a market may be the result of either intense post-entry competition and non-cooperative entry decisions, or collusive entry. This phenomenon and large price differences per pill within a market are widespread in the Swedish generic pharmaceutical market where price regulation through monthly auctions for each active ingredient–dosage form–strength–package size combination channels a large part of demand to the winner within each such substitution group. 22% of the markets are potentially collusive in having at least two firms as monopolies for different substitution groups at least some of the time and prices per pill in such markets are on average significantly higher. We take a structural model tailored to the Swedish circumstances to data on two markets. In one market, the entry patterns (monopoly package sizes) are suggestive of actual, in the other of attempted, collusion. Our counterfactual analysis where we induce substitution across package sizes yield savings of >50% in the first market, but lead to a modest expenditure increase in the other because intensified post-entry competition induces exit.A Stylized Logit Demand Model with Internal Reference Pricing
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I study conditions for the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a logit model that incorporates an internal reference price and a copayment structure. Using the Intermediate Value Theorem, I prove equilibrium existence in a two‑product market and show that the equilibrium is unique under additional restrictions: the two firms must be sufficiently different so that their best‑response functions cross but do not overlap over an interval. I then extend the existence result to an n-product market with an aggregative‑game approach.Teaching Assistant (Evaluations)
Math Camp, Ph.D. level: Aug 2024, Aug 2025
Empirical Industrial Organization, M.Sc. level: Oct 2024, Oct 2025
Principles of Economics, B.Sc. level: Sep 2022, Sep 2023, Sep 2024, Sep 2025
Intermediate Macroeconomics II, B.Sc. level: Mar 2023, Mar 2024, Mar 2025
Mathematics for Economists, B.Sc. level: Oct 2021
Seminar & Conference Presentations
Focal Points and Reference Pricing in the Finnish Pharmaceutical Market (Job Market Paper)
European Commission DG-Comp (Brussels, 2026, invited), Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority (online, 2026, invited), NORIO (Copenhagen, 2026), European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society (Warsaw, 2026, forthcoming)
Competition or Collusion? Entry Decisions in the Swedish Pharmaceutical Market
European Commission DG-Comp (Brussels, 2026, invited), CEPR Health Economics (Toulouse, 2026), EARIE (Mannheim, 2026), CRESSE (Kos, 2026), Swedish Competition and Consumer Authority (online, 2026, invited)